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1. Introduction 
 
  This paper investigates the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma played by players 
1 and 2, wherein we allow side payments between them. The players agree on a side 
payment contract at the beginning of play and make their payments according to the 
terms of the contract at the end of the game. Using this contractual device demonstrates 
the fact that full collusion is sustained by the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and 
that the players’ contractual agreement is robust to renegotiation. 
  The repeated-game literature makes clear that full collusion is impossible to 
achieve in a class of component games such as the prisoners’ dilemma when the 
repetitions are finite.
1 The backward induction technique prevents the players from 
selecting the cooperative action as long as they remain unincentivized by an explicit 
device in their final period of play. This paper shows that full collusion before the final 
period can be sustained by the history-contingent continuation payoffs once the players’ 
final period of play is incentivized by an explicit device of side-payment contract; in 
this case, full collusion is enforceable, even if the player’s liability is severely limited in 
value. 
  In order to show this permissive result, we employ a side-payment contract named 
the penance contract, according to which players are required to pay a small fine to 
their opponents if (and only if) they fail to follow a strategy named the penance strategy 
in the final period. While the basic concept of the penance strategy was introduced by 
Farrell and Maskin (1989) and van Damme (1989) in the literature of repeated games 
with renegotiation, this paper modifies their concept slightly by treating the two players 
asymmetrically: according to the penance strategy profile, the players continue to select 
the cooperative action profile such that player 1 pays for any deviation from the penance 
strategy by selecting the cooperative action in the next period, while player 2 
simultaneously retaliates against that deviation by selecting the defective action; in 
contrast, player 2 pays penance for deviation and suffers retaliation only if that 
deviation occurs unilaterally. This paper shows that the penance strategy profile is the 
                                                 
1 For general surveys on repeated games, see Pearce (1992), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995, Chapter 
5), and Mailath and Samuelson (2006).   3
unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the players agree on the penance contract at 
the beginning of their repeated play. Hence, we can conclude that small fines assure full 
collusion within the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, even if play is finite. 
Moreover, uniqueness holds in every subgame, suggesting that the equilibrium 
restriction of Pareto perfection is automatically satisfied.
2 
  We argue that the penance contract is robust to renegotiation-proofness: in every 
period and every subgame, the players have no incentive to agree to replace the penance 
contract with any other combination of contract and strategy profile at the expense of a 
tiny renegotiation cost. Accordingly, the penance contract is superior to other 
contractual agreements. For instance, we introduce an alternative contract, the trigger 
contract, by which the first player to select the defective action is penalized. Flowing 
from the trigger contract, the trigger strategy profile is the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium, achieving full collusion. However, since this profile pre-determines the 
identity of the penalized player before the final period, the equilibrium play in the 
subgame after a deviation is merely the repetition of the choice of defective action: it is 
inevitably overturned by renegotiation. In contrast, the penance contract never 
determines the player who is to be penalized before reaching the final period; thus, since 
any deviant will immediately rebuild his trust, the continuation payoffs maintain their 
efficiency, even when off the equilibrium path. 
  Several works explore the possibility that full collusion is enforceable even with 
finite play and in the absence of explicit devices. For instance, Benoit and Krishna 
(1985) and Friedman (1985) investigate an alternative class of component games that 
have multiple inefficient Nash equilibria and show that full collusion can be 
approximately sustained by a subgame perfect equilibrium. Radner (1980) and Lipman 
and Wang (2000) show that full collusion is enforceable in the finitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma when players are irrational or when there is a switching cost. For 
further elucidation of collusive phenomena in finitely repeated games, see Sobel (1985) 
                                                 
2 Owing to multiplicity, several works, such as Bernheim and Ray (1989), Farrell and Maskin 
(1989), van Damme (1989), Pearce (1987), and Benoit and Krishna (1993), have used many 
different definitions of Pareto perfection in repeated games.   4
and Neyman (1985, 1999).
3 These works typically depend on the multiplicity of 
equilibria and do not investigate renegotiation-proofness. The points of departure from 
these works are that full collusion is achievable if we incentivize only the final period of 
play and that the players can solve both the uniqueness and renegotiation-proofness by 
agreeing on the penance contract. 
  There is considerable scholarship on implementation in moral hazard which 
clarifies whether a single-period relationship attains the first-best through explicit 
contracting. See Dutta and Radner (1994) and Salanie (1997). In particular, Rey and 
Salanie (1990) and Fudenberg et al. (1990) show that renegotiable short-term contracts 
implement efficiency in a long-term relationship. These works crucially depend on the 
assumption that large side payments are available. In contrast to these works, this paper 
uses only small side payments; obviously, the establishment of a long-term relationship 
dramatically economizes on monetary transfers without harming players’ incentive to 
collude. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model. 
Section 3 specifies the penance-strategy profile and the penance contract, showing that 
full collusion is uniquely enforceable. Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 employ the trigger 
contract alternative and, after comparing it with the penance contract, demonstrate that 
the penance contract satisfies a strong notion of renegotiation-proofness through its 
small fines, whereas the trigger contract does not. Subsection 4.3 applies the findings of 
this paper to more general component games. 
 
 
                                                 
3  See also the experimental work by Andreoni and Varian (1999).   5
2. The Model 
 
Arbitrarily fix a positive integer  2 T ≥ . Let us investigate a situation in which 
players 1 and 2 T   times repeatedly play the component game given by 
12 1 2 (,,,) GA A u u ≡ .  i A  denotes the set of all actions for each player  {1, 2} i∈ , 
12 AAA ≡×, and  : i uA R →  denotes the payoff function for each player i. Let us 
confine our attention to the prisoners’ dilemma game specified by  12 {, } AA c d == , 
12 (,) (,) 1 uc c uc c == ,  12 (,) (,) 1 udc uc d M = =+ , 
12 (, ) (,) uc d udc L == − , and  12 (,) (,) 0 udd udd = = , 
where  0 L > ,  0 M > , and  1 LM +> . Let us call c and d  the cooperative action 
and the defective action respectively. Note that the payoff vector  (1,1)  that is induced 
by the cooperative action profile (,) cc is efficient, that the defective action d  is 
dominant for each player, and that 
    121 2 (,) (,) () () uc c uc c ua ua +> +  for  all  /{( , )} aA c c ∈ , 
which was implied by the inequality of  1 LM + > . Subsection 4.3 investigates more 
general two-player games. 
  For every period  {1,..., } tT ∈ , let us denote by  1 () ( () )
tt ht a A τ τ = = ∈  a history up 
to period t , where  12 () ( () , () ) aa a A τ ττ =∈  implies the action profile selected in 
period {1,..., } t τ ∈ . Let  ( ) Ht  denote the set of all histories up to period  t. Let us call 
() () hT HT ∈  a  complete history. We denote by  (0) h  the  null history. 
Let us define a contract  12 (,) yy y =  as 
:( ) i yH T R →  for  all  {1,2} i∈ , 
where we assume balanced budgets in that 
(1)     12 (() ) (() ) 0 yh T yh T +=  f o r   a l l   () () hT HT ∈ . 
Let  Y  denote the set of all contracts satisfying balanced budgets. At the beginning of 
their repeated play, the players agree on a contract  yY ∈ ; at the end of their repeated 
play, each player i  receives the side payment given by  ( ( )) i yh T R ∈  when the 
complete history  ( ) ( ) hT HT ∈  is realized. The payoff for each player  i induced by   6
the complete history  () () hT HT ∈  is defined as the summation of instantaneous 
payoffs and side payments, thus, 
1
( ( )) ( ( ))
T




+ ∑ . 
Let us denote by  ( , , ) GT y the T  times finitely repeated game associated with 











→ ∪ . The player selects the action  ( ) ( ( 1)) ii i at h t A σ =− ∈  
in each period  {1,..., } tT ∈  when the history  ( 1) ( 1) ht Ht − ∈−  up to period  1 t −  is 
realized. Let  i Σ  denote the set of strategies for player  i.
4 Let  12 (,) σ σσ =  denote a 
strategy profile. Let  12 Σ≡Σ ×Σ   denote the set of all strategy profiles. 
We define the payoff for each player  i  induced by any strategy profile  σ ∈Σ as 
   
1
(,) (() ) (() )
T




=+ ∑ , 
where  12 ( ( 1)) ( ( ( 1)), ( ( 1)) ht ht ht A σ σσ −= − −∈ and  ( ) ( ( 1)) at ht σ = −  for  all 
{1,..., } tT ∈ . For every  {1,..., } tT ∈  and  every  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht − ∈− , we define the payoff 
for each player i  induced  by  σ ∈Σ  after  period  1 t −   when the history 
(1 ) (1 ) ht Ht −∈ −  up to period  1 t −   is realized as 








−= + ∑ , 
where  ( ) ( ( 1), ( ),..., ( )) hT ht at aT =− , and  () (( 1 ) ) ah τ στ = −  for all  { ,..., } tT τ ∈ . A 
strategy profile  σ ∈Σ  is said to be a subgame perfect equilibrium in  (,,) GT y if, for 
every  {1,..., } tT ∈ , every  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht −∈ −, and every  {1, 2} i∈ , 
(,,( 1 ) ) ( , ,,( 1 ) ) ii i j vy h t v y h t σ σσ ′ −≥ − for  all  ii σ′∈Σ , 
where  j i ≠ . 
                                                 
4 For logical convenience, we confine our discussion to pure strategies. We can apply our 
premises, however, to more general classes of behavioral strategies.   7
3. Penance Strategies and Penance Contract 
 
Let us specify 
* σ ∈Σ as  the  penance strategy profile; 
   
*(( 0 ) ) (,) hc c σ = , 
for every  {2,..., } tT ∈  and  every  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht − ∈− , 
   
*(( 1 ) ) (,) ht cc σ −=    if 
* (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at ht σ −= − , 
   
*(( 1 ) ) (,) ht cd σ −=  if 
*
11 (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at h t σ −≠ − , 
and 
   
*(( 1 ) ) (,) ht dc σ −=  if 
*
11 (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at h t σ −= −  and 
*
22 (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at h t σ −≠ − . 
According to the penance strategy profile 
* σ , the players select the cooperative action 
profile ( , ) cc in the initial period. In every period and every subgame, players select 
(,) cc  in the next period if neither one has deviated from 
* σ . In every period and every 
subgame, if player 1 deviates from 
* σ , he penances for his deviation by selecting the 
cooperative action  c in the next period, and player 2 retaliates against that deviation 
by selecting the defective action d  at the same time. In every period and every 
subgame, if player 2 unilaterally deviates from 
* σ , player 1 retaliates by selecting  d  
in the next period, and player 2 penances by selecting  c at the same time. In contrast 
to the definitions of penance strategy profile occurring in works such as Farrell and 
Maskin (1989) and van Damme (1989), this paper’s definition treats the players 
asymmetrically: if both players deviate simultaneously, player 1 does penance, but 
player 2 never does. 
According to the penance strategy profile, the players continue to choose  (,) cc, 
thereby achieving full cooperation. A deviant is penalized only in the next period; the 
opponent retaliates with the defective action choice  d  while the deviant also being 
required to penance by selecting the cooperative action  c, a more costly choice than 
the defective action. They can return to full cooperation two periods later as long as they 
follow the penance strategy profile immediately after the deviation. 
Arbitrarily fix a positive real number  0 X > , which is regarded as the fine, where   8
we assume that 
(2)     max[ , ] X LM > . 
Let us specify 
* yY ∈  as the penance contract; for every  {1, 2} i∈  and every 
() () hT HT ∈ , 
*(() ) 0 i yh T =    if 
* () (( 1 ) ) aT hT σ = − , 
   
*(() ) 0 i yh T =    if 
*
11 () (( 1 ) ) aT h T σ ≠ −  and 
*
22 () (( 1 ) ) aT h T σ ≠− , 
*(() ) i yh T X =−  if 
* () (( 1 ) ) ii aT h T σ ≠ −  and 
* () (( 1 ) ) jj aT h T σ =− , 
and 
*(() ) i yh T X =      if 
* () (( 1 ) ) ii aT h T σ = −  and 
* () (( 1 ) ) jj aT h T σ ≠− , 
where  j i ≠ . The penance contract 
* y  is contingent only on the players’ final period 
of play, depending on whether they follow the penance strategy profile 
* σ   in the final 
period  T . A player is penalized by paying the fine of  X   to the opponent if (and only 
if) he deviates from 
* σ  in the final period  T . Note that a player who follows 
* σ  in 
the final period is never penalized, even if he deviates from 
* σ   before the final period. 
If both players jointly deviate in the final period, their payments are cancelled out. 
 
Theorem 1:  The penance strategy profile 
* σ   is the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in 
* (,, ) GT y .  
 
Proof: No player  {1, 2} i∈  is ever required to pay the fine of  X  after selecting the 
action 
*(( 1 ) ) i hT σ −  in the final period  T ; any other action triggers a fine. Since the 
instantaneous gain from selecting 
* () (( 1 ) ) ii aT h T σ ≠ −  is at most  max[ , ] LM , it 
follows from (2) that each player  i selects 
* () (( 1 ) ) ii aT h T σ = − . 
Arbitrarily fix any period  {1,..., 1} tT ∈ −  and a history  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht − ∈−  up to 
period  1 t − . Assume that both players follow 
* σ  after period t. If player 1 selects 
*
1(( 1 ) ) ht σ −  in period t, his future payoff after period  t is at least Tt − . If he does 
not select 
*
1(( 1 ) ) ht σ −  in period t, his future payoff equals  1 Tt L − −− . Hence, the   9
difference in future payoff is at least  1 L+ . Since  1 LM + > , this difference is greater 
than the maximum difference in instantaneous payoffs (thus, max[ , ] LM ). Hence, 
player 1 selects 
*
11 () ( ( 1 ) ) at h t σ =−  in  period t. 
  Suppose that player 1 selects 
*
11 () ( ( 1 ) ) at h t σ = −  in period t.
5 If player 2 selects 
*
2(( 1 ) ) ht σ −  in  period t, his future payoff after period  t equals Tt − . If player 2 does 
not select 
*
2(( 1 ) ) ht σ − , his future payoff equals  1 Tt L − −− . Hence, the difference in 
future payoffs equals  1 L+ . Since  1 LM + > , this difference is greater than the 
maximum difference in instantaneous payoffs (thus, max[ , ] LM ). Hence, player 2 
selects 
*
22 () ( ( 1 ) ) at h t σ =−  in  period t. 
From the above observations, we have proved that 
* σ  is the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium in 
* (,, ) GT y . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Theorem 1 implies that full cooperation can be sustained by the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium, where no side payment takes place on the equilibrium path. 
Incentivizing only the final period of play is sufficient to achieve full cooperation.   
 Given  1 M > , using the basic concept of penance contract and penance strategy 
profile becomes inevitable, at least in the final two periods: the opponent’s retaliatory 
selection of the defective action in the final period is insufficient to incentivize a player 
to select the cooperative action in period  1 T − . In addition, we have to urge any deviant 
to pay penance for his deviation by selecting the cooperative action in the final period, 
which costs him more than would the defective action. 
 
                                                 
5 This supposition is crucial to this proof because of the asymmetric treatment in the 
specification of 
* σ .   10
4. Discussions 
 
4.1. Trigger Strategy and Trigger Contract 
 
Since the penance contract 
* y   incentivizes only the final period of play, we need 
only a small fine—negligible compared to the entire payoff—provided the time length 
T  is sufficiently large. We can find alternative contracts with small fines to eliminate 
unwanted equilibria once we survey a range of contracts that do not necessarily 
incentivize only the last period of play. 
For instance, let us specify  ˆ yY ∈  as the trigger contract. For every  {1,2} i∈ , 
every {1,..., } tT ∈ , and every complete history  ( ) ( ) hT HT ∈  such that  ( ) ( , ) ac c τ =  
for all  {1,..., 1} t τ ∈− , and  ( ) ( , ) at cc ≠ , 
ˆ (() ) 0 i yh T =    if  () ( , ) at dd = , 
ˆ (() ) i yh T X =−  if  ( ) i at d =  and  () j at c = , 
and 
ˆ (() ) i yh T X =    if  ( ) i at c =  and  ( ) j at d = . 
For the complete history  ( ) ( ) hT HT ∈  such  that  ( ) ( , ) at cc =  for  all  {1,..., } tT ∈ , 
ˆ (() ) 0 i yh T = . 
According to the trigger contract  ˆ y , any first player to select the defective action  d  is 
penalized by paying the fine of  X   to the opponent. 
Let us specify  ˆ σ ∈Σ as  the  trigger strategy profile; 
   
*(( 0 ) ) (,) hc c σ = , 
for every  {2,..., } tT ∈  and  every  ( 1) ( 1) ht Ht − ∈− , 
   
*(( 1 ) ) (,) ht cc σ −=    if 
* () (( 1 ) ) ah τσ τ = −  for  all  {1,..., 1} t τ ∈− , 
and 
   
*(( 1 ) ) (,) ht dd σ −=  otherwise. 
According to the trigger strategy profile  ˆ σ , the players select ( , ) cc in the initial 
period. In every period and every subgame, the players select ( , ) cc if neither one   11
selected  d   in any previous period; they select  (,) dd  otherwise. Hence, they continue 
to choose  (,) cc, thereby achieving full cooperation. 
The basic concept of trigger contract is inspired by the Abreu-Matsushima 
mechanism (Abreu and Matsushima [1992, 1994]) in the implementation theory 
literature: a “tail-chasing” competition à la Abreu-Matsushima motivates each player to 
wish to avoid being the first one to select the defective action, rendering the occurrence 
of such a selection virtually impossible. 
 
Proposition 2:  The trigger strategy profile  ˆ σ  is the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in  ˆ (,,) G T y , where we assume the inequality of (2). 
 
Proof: Given that no player has selected  d  before, by selecting  d  instead of c in 
the current period, a player earns the additional instantaneous payoff that is at most 
max[ , ] LM  but is also required to pay the fine of  X , which, as the inequality of (2) 
implies, is greater than  max[ , ] LM . From the next period onwards, the player must 
continue to select (,) dd, since the continuation of (,) dd is the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium in the corresponding subgame. Hence, no player wishes to be the 
first one to select d , a fact which induces a tail-chasing competition à la 
Abreu-Matsushima between the players. Hence,  ˆ σ  is the unique subgame perfect 





  The penance contract has an advantage over the trigger contract: while the trigger 
contract is vulnerable to renegotiation, the penance contract is not. Arbitrarily fix a 
positive real number  0 η >  as the renegotiation cost. In every period and every 
subgame, let us allow the players to replace the original agreement concerning strategy 
profile and contract with any other agreement. To do this, each player must spend the 
renegotiation cost  0 η > . A combination of strategy profile and contract  (,) yY σ ∈Σ×    12
is said to be renegotiation-proof if for every  {1,..., } tT ∈  and  every  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht −∈ −, 
there exists no other combination  (,) / { ( , ) } yY y σ σ ′ ′ ∈Σ×  such  that 
(, ( 1 ) ,) ( , ( 1 ) ,) ii vh t y vh t y σ ησ ′ ′ −− ≥ −  for  all  {1,2} i∈ . 
The greater the renegotiation cost  η , the less restrictive is the renegotiation-proofness. 
From the specification of the prisoners’ dilemma game, it follows that any combination 
(,) yY σ ∈Σ×  is renegotiation-proof if (and only if) for every  {1,..., } tT ∈  and every 
(1 ) (1 ) ht Ht −∈ −, 
(3)     12 ( , ( 1), ) ( , ( 1), ) 2( 1) 2 v h ty v h tyT t σ ση −+ −> − + − . 
The following proposition shows that the penance contract needs only a small 
renegotiation cost to satisfy renegotiation-proofness, whereas the trigger contract needs 
a large one. 
 
Proposition 3:  The combination of penance strategy profile and penance contract 
** (,) y σ  is  renegotiation-proof if and only if 







The combination of trigger strategy profile and trigger contract  ˆˆ (,) y σ  is 
renegotiation-proof if and only if 
(5)     1 T η ≥− . 
 
Proof: Note that 
** **
12 (, (1 ) ,) (, (1 ) ,) vh ty vh ty σσ −+ −  is equivalent to 
either  2( 1) Tt −+  or 2( ) 1 Tt ML − ++ − . 
Note also that, for every  {2,..., } tT ∈ , there exists  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht − ∈−  such  that 
   
** **
12 (, (1 ) ,) (, (1 ) ,)2 ( ) 1 vh ty vh ty T t M L σσ −+ −= − + + − . 
Hence, it follows from (3) that the necessary and sufficient condition for 
** (,) y σ  to  be 
renegotiation-proof is 
   2( ) 1 2( 1) 2 Tt ML Tt η − ++ − > −+ −  for  all  {2,..., } tT ∈ , 
which is the same as the inequality (4). 
 Note  that  12 ˆˆ ˆˆ (,( 1 ) ,) (,( 1 ) ,) v h ty v h ty σ σ −+ − is  equivalent  to   13
either  2( 1) Tt −+  or  0. 
Note that, for every  {2,..., } tT ∈ , there exists  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht − ∈−  such  that 
   
** **
12 (, (1 ) ,) (, (1 ) ,)0 vh ty vh ty σσ −+ −= . 
Hence, it follows from (3) that the necessary and sufficient condition for  ˆˆ (,) y σ  to be 
renegotiation-proof is 
   0 2 ( 1 ) 2 Tt η >− + −  for  all  {2,..., } tT ∈ , 
that is,  0 2( 1) 2 T η >− − , which is equivalent to the inequality of (5). 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Proposition 2 implies that the penance contract satisfies renegotiation-proofness 
much more easily than does the trigger contract. Note from the inequality of (4) that, 
given a sufficiently large  T , 
** (,) y σ  is renegotiation-proof even if the renegotiation 
cost is negligible compared to the entire payoff. However, it is clear from the inequality 
of (5) that  ˆˆ (,) y σ   is renegotiation-proof only if the renegotiation cost is high relative to 
the entire payoff. 
  Under the penance contract, the fact that penalization is never determined before 
the end of play is crucial in its renegotiation-proofness. Let us consider any agreement 
by the terms of which side payments are determined before reaching the final period  T . 
Note that, in any subgame after this determination, the repetition of defective action 
profile ( , ) dd  is the only possible subgame perfect equilibrium: the players are willing 
to replace their original agreement with a more cooperative one, resulting in a 
combination of penance contract and penance strategy profile, or 
** (,) y σ  in  this  case. 
  The requirement of renegotiation-proofness in this subsection might be too 
restrictive: the players are allowed to replace the original agreement by any agreement 
that does not necessarily meet their incentive compatibility. Nevertheless, we cannot 
expect the combination of trigger-strategy profile and trigger contract  ˆˆ (,) y σ  to  satisfy 
a less demanding version of renegotiation-proofness. Whenever any player deviates, 
they are both willing to replace  ˆˆ (,) y σ  by 
** (,) y σ , which meets a more restrictive 
standard of renegotiation-proofness. 
   14
4.3. Generalization 
 
We have focused on the prisoners’ dilemma game. This subsection extends our 
arguments to more general two-player games. For each  {1,2} i∈ , let us select three 
actions,  ii cA ∈ ,  ii dA ∈ , and  ii eA ∈ , which satisfy that for every  {1, 2} i∈ , 
(, ) (, ) m a x(, ) (, )
ii
i i ji i j i i ji i j aA ucc ued uac ucc
∈ − >− , 
(, ) (, ) m a x(, ) (, )
ii
i i ji i j i i ji i j aA ucc ued uad ued
∈ − >− , 
and 
   112 212 1 2 (, ) (, ) () () ucc ucc ua ua + ≥+ for  all aA ∈ , 
where  j i ≠ . Let us call  ii cA ∈ ,  ii dA ∈ , and  ii eA ∈  the cooperative action, the 
defective action, and the costly action for each iN ∈  respectively. The case of the 
prisoners’ dilemma game implied that  ii cec = =  and  i dd =  for  all  {1, 2} i∈ . 
Let us specify 
** σ ∈Σ as  the generalized penance strategy profile; 
   
**
12 (( 0 ) ) (, ) hc c σ = , 
for every  {2,..., } tT ∈  and  every  (1 ) (1 ) ht Ht − ∈− , 
   
**
12 (( 1 ) ) (, ) ht c c σ −=  if 
** (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at ht σ −= − , 
   
**
12 (( 1 ) ) (, ) ht e d σ −=  if 
**
11 (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at h t σ −≠ − , 
and 
   
**
11 (( 1 ) ) ( , ) ht d e σ −=  if 
**
11 (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at h t σ −= −  and 
**
22 (1 ) ( (2 ) ) at h t σ −≠ − . 
According to 
** σ , the players select the cooperative action profile  12 (,) cc   in the initial 
period. In every period and every subgame, if no player deviates from 
* σ , they select 
12 (,) cc   in the next period. In every period and every subgame, if player 1 deviates from 
* σ , he selects the costly action  1 e , and player 2 selects the defective action  2 d  in the 
next period. In every period and every subgame, if player 2 unilaterally deviates from 
* σ , player 1 selects  1 d , and player 2 selects  2 e   in the next period. 
Let us specify 
** y  as the generalized penance contract; for every  {1,2} i∈  and   15
every  () () hT HT ∈ , 
**(() ) 0 i yh T=    if 
** () (( 1 ) ) aT hT σ = − , 
   
**(() ) 0 i yh T=    if 
**
11 () (( 1 ) ) aT h T σ ≠ −  and 
**
22 () (( 1 ) ) aT h T σ ≠− , 
**(() ) i yh T X =−  if 
** () (( 1 ) ) ii aT h T σ ≠ −  and 
** () (( 1 ) ) jj aT h T σ =− , 
and 
**(() ) i yh T X =  if 
** () (( 1 ) ) ii aT h T σ = −  and 
** () (( 1 ) ) jj aT h T σ ≠− , 
where  j i ≠ . According to 
** y , each player is penalized by paying the fine of  X  if 
(and only if) he deviates from 
** σ   in the final period  T . 
Let us assume that 
max ( , ) ( , )
ii
iij iij aA X uac ucc
∈ >−  and  max ( , ) ( , )
ii
ii j ii j aA X uad ued
∈ >− . 
In the case of the prisoners’ dilemma game, this assumption corresponds to the 
inequality of (2). As with Theorem 1, we can prove that the generalized penance 
strategy profile 
** σ   is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in 
** (,, ) GT y .  
  Let us assume also that 
    11 2 21 2 112 212 (, ) (, ) (, ) (, )2 ued ued ucc ucc η +> +− , 
and 
    112 212 1 12 212 (,) (,) (,) (,)2 ude ude ucc ucc η +> +− . 
In the case of the prisoners’ dilemma game, this assumption corresponds to the 
inequality of (4). As with Proposition 3, we can prove that the combination of the 
generalized penance strategy profile and the generalized penance contract 
** ** (,) y σ  is 
renegotiation-proof. 
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